| Contents |
Introduction : counterinsurgency and the uses of history -- The Army's counterinsurgency war in Vietnam -- "Out of the rice paddies" : the 1970s and the decline of counterinsurgency -- Low intensity conflict in the Reagan years -- Peacekeeping and operations other than war in the 1990s -- Mr. Rumsfeld's war : transformation, doctrine and planning for Iraq -- Counterinsurgency and "Vietnam" in Iraq 2003-2006 -- The return to counterinsurgency : FM 3-24 and the "surge" -- A never-ending war? : the renegotiation of "Vietnam" in Afghanistan. |
| Abstract |
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years and the conflict in Bosnia, culminating in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It explains how the lessons of Vietnam led the Army to Iraq and the way in which their confronting and reimagining of these lessons offered them a way out of that war. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and describes the interplay between the two processes, demonstrating how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references (pages 215-274) and index. |
| LCCN | 2012043943 |
| ISBN | 9780804785815 (cloth : alk. paper) |
| ISBN | 0804785813 (cloth : alk. paper) |
